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ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT
PART ONE*
SIGMUND TIMBERGt
Benevolent and hostile critics of the current administrative
process alike agree that administrative procedures should be
geared to certain definite objectives. The administrative process
should afford affected parties full knowledge of the bases of ad-
ministrative decision, conserve the time of reviewing tribunals
and litigants by apprising them of the issues involved and limit-
ing the number of issues, and convey generally the assurance
that constitutional limitations of due process and delegation are
being observed. Consistently with all this, administration must
proceed with expedition; otherwise administrative acts tend to
be deprived of operative significance, and become merely reminis-
cences of the way in which once-exigent situations could have
been administratively handled. In the forefront of devices said
to insure the attainment of these objectives is the requirement
that final administrative action be accompanied by findings of
fact.1 It is the purpose of this article to explore the validity of
that assertion.
The first two sections of this article deal with findings of so-
called "ultimate" fact-factual determinations called for on the
face of the statute itself-contrasting the exhaustively condem-
natory attitude of the 1935 Supreme Court with the milder yet
still critical approach of the present Court. The third section
explores rationales whereby administrative bodies have been
deemed justified in dispensing with findings of fact; the explora-
tion is necessarily inconclusive because the rationales are vague
* The second and concluding part of this article will appear in the Feb-
ruary issue of the Quarterly.
t Senior Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington,
D. C. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the views of the
Commission, but are personal to the author.
1. See Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administra-
tive Law (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 647, 666. Findings accompanying final action
must be differentiated from the proposed findings that are served upon
parties at the inception, or during the course, of an administrative pro-
ceeding. Gellhorn, Administrative Law, Cases and Comments (1940) c. 9.
The latter class of findings will here be discussed only by way of analogy
to the former, see Part Two, infra.
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and indeterminate.** The fourth and fifth sections set forth
two formulations of the doctrine that there must be "support-
ing" findings of fact as well as findings of ultimate fact-one
evolved by the Supreme Court during 1931 to 1935, and the other
receiving its most explicit statement at the hands of Judge
Stephens in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
After a sixth section discussing some of the similarities between
judicial and administrative findings, the concluding portion of
this essay develops some of the policy criteria and logical pre-
suppositions which underlie the entire subject, and attempts to
suggest a pragmatic and purposive rather than a dogmatic and
restrictive approach to the problem.
I. FINDINGS OF ULTIMATE FACT - 1935
On January 7, 1935, the Supreme Court, in the "Hot Oil" case, 2
invalidated section 9 (c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
authorizing the President to prohibit the transportation in inter-
state commerce of petroleum or petroleum products produced
within a state in amounts in excess of that state's limitation of
production, i. e., "hot oil." The authorization, it was held, con-
stituted a forbidden delegation of legislative power to the Presi-
dent, in that he was not governed by adequate statutory standards
as to when to make the prohibition of transportation effective.8
Evidence had been presented, both in the record and in the argu-
ment of counsel, that the general policy of the act, as set forth
in section 1, would be effectuated by prohibiting the transporta-
tion of "hot oil" under section 9 (c). It had been pointed out
that such a prohibition would, in the language of section 1, serve
to "eliminate unfair competitive practices," "conserve natural re-
sources," "promote the fullest possible utilization of the present
productive capacity" of the oil industry, and "except as may be
temporarily required * * * avoid undue restriction of production"
of oil. Nevertheless, over Mr. Justice Cardozo's eloquent but
unavailing protest, the Court flatly refused to concede that a
legislative policy which presumably motivated the entire act had
any relevance to the specific mandate of section 9(c). Section
** Only the first three sections of the article appear in this issue. The
remaining sections will be published in the February number.
2. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293 U. S. 388.
3. The character of the prohibition had been predetermined by Congress;
the only element of unexercised discretion in the executive was temporal.
1941]
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9 (c) was declared void for the sole reason that there was no
explicit verbal connective between the declaration of policy in
the statute and one of its key provisions.
A similar failure, this time on the part of the President, to
translate self-evident ratiocination into written form led the
Court to decide that, even if section 9 (c) itself could be upheld,
the executive order which he had issued pursuant to that section
was invalid. The President, in issuing the order, had made no
findings of fact as to which one of the several standards set
forth in section I he had relied on in putting into effect the pro-
hibition against transporting "hot oil." According to Chief Jus-
tice Hughes' argument, the President, unless pinned down by
such a finding of fact, possessed an unfettered discretion, in that
he was "free to select as he chooses from the many and various
objects generally described in the first section, and then to act
without making any finding with respect to any object that he
does select." There was no contention that the executive order
did not in fact carry out the basic policies of the act, nor any
intimation of the possibility that, since his action was to be
drastic, Congress might have intended the President to act only
when it would effectuate the declared policy of the act in aggre-
gate, rather than a mere segment of that policy such as the
elimination of unfair competitive practices. Furthermore, there
was no recognition of the fact that the separate verbal segments
of the declaration of policy could not, and were not, intended to
refer to mutually-exclusive, compartmentalized phenomena-the
same regulatory activity that would tend to "eliminate unfair
competitive practices," would also tend "to remove obstructions
to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce," "to pro-
mote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive
capacity of industries," and so forth.4 The Court's opinion, liter-
4. Cf., as furnishing a possible contrast, Elite Dairy Products, Inc. v.
Ten Eyck (1936) 271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. (2d) 606, 607-608, 610, where
the State Commissioner of Agriculture was instructed to grant no license
to purchase, handle, sell or distribute milk, unless he was "satisfied that
the applicant is qualified by character, experience, financial responsibility
and equipment to properly conduct the proposed business, that the issuance
of the license will not tend to a destructive competition in a market already
adequately served, and that issuance of the license is in the public interest"
In that case the court pointed out: "The conditions imposed by the Legis-
lature are separable. Failure to show compliance with any one condition
may be fatal. Then the applicant is entitled to findings which will show
the particular matter determined against him."
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ally followed, would have compelled the President, in the process
of fact-finding, to make an unreal choice among overlapping and
intermeshing criteria of action.
It seems incongruous that the Supreme Court, which has so
frequently said that a statute under interpretation must be
viewed in its entirety as an expression of total legislative intent,
should have rejected this wholesome Gestalt-like concept in this
case." Why should it have assumed that a legislative policy which
purportedly motivated a Congress in large measure ignorant of
"hot oil" and which was put into immediate emergency action
did not survive, for lack of purely verbal taggings, to guide an
informed executive in charge of that action? Is not the notion
legalistic and unreal that Congressional addition of an introduc-
tory phrase to section 9(c), or administrative repetition of a
few statutory phrases in the form of findings of fact as a preface
to an executive order, would have converted the statute and the
executive order from an unfettered and invalid delegation of
legislative power into a proper exercise of administrative power
circumscribed by appropriate standards ?6 Apologists for the
case have said that the Court was motivated by considerations
of judicial statesmanship, and that underlying the syntactical
considerations which appear on the surface of the Court's opin-
5. For the most recent expression of the viewpoint that statutory con-
text must prevail over the rules of syntax, see United States v. American
Trucking Ass'n, Inc. (1940) 310 U. S. 534, 542-544; United States v. Dick-
erson (1940) 310 U. S. 554, 562. To the extent that findings of fact are
regarded as determinants of administrative action, the central thesis of
Gestalt Psychology is apropos: " * * * the causal unit is often a configura-
tion which cannot be broken up without losing its distinctive causal proper-
ties." Russell, Outline of Philosophy (1927).
6. The oddity of the "Hot Oil" case becomes highlighted by the fact that
it was decided the same year as Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White
(1935) 296 U. S. 176. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld an order
of a State Department of Agriculture, requiring the use of containers of
a certain type, form and dimensions in the marketing of strawberries and
raspberries; the lack of accompanying findings was excused on the ground
that the regulation authorized by the statute was in the nature of general
legislation.
The "Hot Oil" case is the sole authority standing in the way of the rule
that, where an administrative body exercises legislative authority, it need
not, under the due process clause, make findings of fact. Rohrer v. Milk
Control Board (1936) 121 Pa. Super. 281, 184 At]. 133, follows the "Hot
Oil" case both with respect to the adequacy of legislative standards and
the impropriety of administrative regulation -without findings of fact, but
the decision was reversed in (1936) 322 Pa. 257, 186 Atl. 336, on the ground
that the issues had not been raised at the proper time. The Pennsylvania
milk control statute now requires that findings of fact be made.
1941]
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ion was an acute distrust of the host of new federal administra-
tive agencies, expressive of a novel and somewhat startling policy
of business regulation by government, which had suddenly mush-
roomed forth.7 So far had the activities of these agencies escaped
adequate scrutiny and coordination even at governmental hands,
that in the "Hot Oil" case itself both counsel for the government
and the lower courts had been unaware of the elimination by the
President of an important provision of the executive order on
which the litigation was based.8
We now have a reconstituted Court, solidly established admin-
istrative bodies with patterns of conduct familiar to the courts,
and a Federal Register Act that renders it impossible that regu-
latory provisions will stage unannounced appearances or disap-
pearances. The Lord Chief Justice's condemnation of English
administrative law has been answered by the Report of the Com-
mittee on Minister's Powers; the advocates of our own Walter-
Logan Bill have been replied to by the Attorney General's Com-
mittee on Administrative Procedure; and there is general ac-
ceptance of current governmental regulation of business. Are
we prepared to cease construing the grant of administrative
power under a statute as strictly as a deed of property, or a
contract under seal? Are we prepared to concede that adminis-
trative agencies have had ample time to study the statutes which
they administer, and that the republication of portions of the
statute in the form of findings of fact, as a prelude to the exer-
cise of their powers, is inutile? Or shall jurisprudence in the
field of administrative findings remain, to borrow Bentham's
7. This distrust was epitomized on the English scene by Lord Chief
Justice Hewart's The New Despotism (1929) and on the American by Beck,
Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy (rev. ed. 1933). As far as the Supreme
Court itself was concerned, it may be noted that Crowell v. Benson (1932)
285 U. S. 22 (imposing as a constitutional requirement judicial review de
iovo for quasi-jurisdictional facts in federal workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings) had, like March, come in like a lion, see Dickinson, Crowell v.
Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of
"Constitutional Fact" (1932) 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1055, although it now seems
to have gone out like a lamb, see Note (1938) 24 Va. L. Rev. 653. The
Interstate Commerce Commission was being castigated for failure to make
findings of fact on "basic" and "essential" facts, see Part Two, infra. And
the N. R. A., A. A. A., and Bituminous Coal Acts were only a few months
short of judicial invalidation.
8. See Gellhorn, Administrative Law, Cases & Comments (1940) 412.
Prior to this, a similar lapse had occurred in the case of a criminal indict-
nent, see Griswold, Government in Ignorance of Law-A Plea for Better
Publication of Executive Legislation (1934) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 204.
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phrase, "the art of being methodically ignorant of what every-
body knows"? 9
II. FINDINGS OF ULTIMATE FACT - 1941
Current indications are that we have made progress, but have
not completely passed the stage of artistic ignorance. While the
courts no longer invalidate administrative action or impede it
unbearably, they still cling to occasional conceptualistic mum-
mery that retards it. The presence of a statutory requirement
for administrative findings of fact is still cited as a guarantee
that no invalid delegation of legislative power has taken place,10
and the requirement of such findings is a well-established legis-
lative practice.
Some cases, however, attach a deeper significance to adminis-
trative findings. For example, in N. L. R. B. v. White Swan
Company,"' the Court dismissed a certificate from a circuit court
of appeals which attempted to elicit from the Supreme Court a
determination whether a laundry business located on a state line
was subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. One of the alleged grounds of dismissal was that the cer-
tificate did not indicate in which one of three possible senses the
unfair labor practice found by the Board affected commerce. Un-
fair labor practices, to come within the statutory jurisdiction of
the Board, may be either "in commerce, or burdening or obstruct-
ing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing com-
merce or the free flow of commerce." Despite the fact that most
of the disputes before the Board could be said to fall within all
three categories, the Court hewed to the superficial approach,
9. Bentham, A T reatise on Jitdicial Evidence (Dumont tr. 1825) 6.
10. "The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of
the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Those essen-
tials are preserved when Congress specifies the basic conclusions of fact
upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data by a designated adminis-
trative agency, it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective.
"The present statute satisfies those requirements. The basic facts to be
ascertained administratively are whether the prescribed wage as applied
to an industry will substantially curtail employment, and whether to attain
the legislative end there is need for wage differentials applicable to classes
in industry. The factors to be considered in arriving at these determina-
tions, both those specified and 'other relevant factors,' are those which are
relevant to or have a bearing on the statutory objective." Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div. (1941) 312 U. S. 126, 145.
11. (1941) 313 U. S. 23.
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as it had in the "Hot Oil" case, that three separable possibilities
were involved from among which selection was possible. In
Phelps-Dodge Corporation v. N. L. R. B.,12 the Board had de-
creed the reinstatement of certain individuals affected by unfair
labor practices, saying that it would do so even were it shown
that those individuals had obtained substantially equivalent em-
ployment elsewhere.13 The Court majority, speaking through
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, reversed the Board on the ground that,
in ordering the reinstatement of these individuals, the Board
merely relied on its legal power under the statute so to do, and
did not make an explicit finding that the reinstatement of men
who had obtained employment elsewhere would effectuate the
policy of the act. We quote from Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and
attempt, in a parallel column, a paraphrase which we trust does
not do undue violence to the views of the dissenters in this case
(Murphy, Douglas, and Black, JJ.):-
"The administrative process
will best be vindicated by clar-
ity in its exercise. Since Con-
gress had defined the authority
of the Board and the procedure
by which it must be asserted
and has charged the federal
courts with the duty of review-
ing the Board's orders (§10 (e)
and (f)), it will avoid needless
litigation and make for effec-
tive and expeditious enforce-
ment of the Board's order to
require the Board to disclose
the basis of its order. * * * All
we ask of the Board is to give
clear indication that it has ex-
ercised the discretion with
which Congress has empowered
it. This is to affirm most em-
"The judicial process will
best be vindicated by not trans-
muting desirable formalities in-
to a positive rule of law. Since
Congress has defined the au-
thority of the Board and the
procedure by which it must be
asserted, and has charged the
federal courts with the duty of
reviewing the Board's orders,
it will avoid needless litigation,
in this case as well as in future
cases, and make for effective
and expeditious enforcement of
the Board's order, for us to
draw the obvious inference that
the order was intended to effec-
tuate the declared policy of the
act. * * * All we ask of the
Board is to give as clear indi-
12. (1941) 313 U. S. 177.
13. The Board had originally found that the men had not obtained sub-
stantially equivalent employment, but the court below had held that the
proof did not support its findings on this point, and remanded the case
to the Board for additional evidence on that issue. The Board subsequently
took the issue out of the case, by expressly declining to ask for its review
in the Supreme Court; it said it considered the fact that the employees
had obtained substantially equivalent employment irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether it would order their reinstatement.
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phatically the authority of the cation as possible that it has
Board." exercised the discretion with
which Congress has empowered
it, although some of our num-
ber believe that it would have
been desirable for the Board to
make an explicit finding of fact
on this point. This is to affirm
most emphatically the author-
ity of the Board, without stul-
tifying its effectiveness in the
current controversy."
Surely the minority has the better case; an agency trying to ful-
fill a mandate like that imposed upon the Board unshakeably ties
up the issuance of its orders to the determination of whether
these orders will effectuate the declared policy of its act,34 and
the Board had obviously decided in the Phelps-Dodge case that
the obtaining of substantially equivalent employment was irrele-
vant to that determination.
The White Swan and Phelps-Dodge decisions are not vicious
ones. Their immediate consequences were negligible. The Cir-
cuit Court in the White Swan case took the hint implicit in the
Supreme Court's opinion and subsequently upheld the Board. 5
As an aftermath of the Phelps-Dodge case, at the first possible
opportunity, the Board spelled out in detail the reasons why the
reinstatement of employees who had obtained substantially equiv-
alent employment elsewhere would effectuate the policy of the
act,18 in language which one may confidently expect will be
adopted in all subsequent decisions of the Board dealing with
the same issue. The long-run consequence of the Phelps-Dodge
decision will be the mechanical regurgitation of "canned" find-
ings on a subject as to which nobody can entertain any reasonable
14. A determination aptly described by Justice Frankfurter as "one of
the most intractable of legislative problems." Tigner v. Texas (1940) 310
U. S. 141, 148.
15. (C. C. A. 4, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 1002.
16. Matter of Ford Motor Co. and Internatl Union U. A. W., Local
Union No. 249 (1941) 31 N. L. R. B. 170. Furthermore, the Labor Board
issued instructions to its staff emphasizing the irrelevancy of the entire
issue. Instructions issued to all attorneys by the General Counsel in effect
said that the Board would not itself raise the issue, and its trial exam-
iners were to exclude evidence presented by employers on the issue, but
were to receive offers of proof. If the issue were raised by the employer,
it would be considered and dealt with in the Board's decision, on the offer
of proof.
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doubts concerning the Board's opinion. The immediate result was
that the Board met with a purely ephemeral reversal, in that the
Phelps-Dodge Corporation settled, realizing that checkmate was
inevitable even if forestalled for one move.17 Other circuit courts
of appeal, similarly appreciating the futility of a remand to the
Board for inescapable findings on this issue, have sustained the
Board on rehearing without remand.18
The real danger is a potential one, that the judiciary, in cor-
recting the rhetoric of administrative decisions, la will tend to
ignore the all-important time variable. Thus, for example, the
eighth circuit, leaning heavily on the Phelps-Dodge decision, has
recently remanded an order of the Federal Security Administra-
tor fixing definitions and standards for various skim milk prod-
ucts, on the ground that the Administrator merely referred to
the statutory provision upon which his order was grounded rather
than reciting explicitly that "such action will promote honesty
and fair dealing in the interest of consumers.1 20 After all, there
is no evidence that administrative agencies would turn a deaf
ear to sharply-worded dicta on the part of reviewing courts, or
that they can be brought to book only by a sharper sanction than
rebuke.2 1 The reversal of administrative action by a court be-
17. In the Phelps-Dodge situation, as in N. L. R. B. v. Nat'l Casket Co.
(C. C. A. 2, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 992, 995, the employer may also be a
sufferer from the Fabian impact of the law, in that back wages which he
would have to pay cumulated as settlement was deferred.
18. See the denial of rehearings in N. L. R. B. v. Mall Tool Co. (C. C.
A. 7, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 700, 704; Eagle-Picher Mining & S. Co. v. N. L.
R. B. (C. C. A. 8, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 903; El Paso Electric Co. v. N. L.
M B. (C. C. A. 5, 1941) 119 F. (2d) 581.
19. In this connection, it may be borne in mind that litigants have on
occasion insisted that administrative findings adhere punctiliously to the
exact wording of the statute, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.(1936) 299 U. S. 304, 331; Morgan v. U. S. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1940) 32
F. Supp. 546, 563. Fortunately, the courts have usually balked at such
literal extremes. But cf. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Sec'y of Agriculture (C. C. A.
7, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 258.
20. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt (C. C. A. 8, 1941) 122
F. (2d) 564; cf. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Sec'y of Agriculture (C. C. A. 7, 1941)
120 F. (2d) 258. Supporting the view that the Phelps-Dodge doctrine has
been expanded is the fact that the Twin City case involved an exercise of
"quasi-legislative power," whereas the Phelps-Dodge case concerned what
would conventionally be described as quasi-judicial action, see Part Two,
infra. Also, the court rested its decision directly on the "Hot Oil" case and
on two Supreme Court cases requiring jurisdictional findings by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
21. The Supreme Court has on occasion taken an admonitory approach,
merely criticizing the administrative tribunal for not explicitly stating find-
ings implicit in the evidence before it. See, e. g., Beaumont, S. L. & W.
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cause of rhetorical defects in an order or decree would be sub-
ject to criticism even in the case of a proceeding solely between
clear-cut adversaries equally equipped to withstand the conse-
quences of delay. For it to take similar action in the case of
the National Labor Relations Board is to overlook the fact that
the public has an interest in the expeditious settlement of labor
controversies that far outweighs any additional effectiveness
which the Court's rebuke may gather because accompanied by
the enhanced sanction of a remand. Furthermore, labor's right
to collective bargaining must reach fruition within a short period
of time, if its legislative victory in obtaining the right is not to
prove illusory.22 Pedagogic zeal should not obscure the fact that
the mere establishment of an administrative agency is a legisla-
tive affirmation of the popular conviction that action is necessary,
and the nullification of action is vicious; that delay is a boon to
a person benefiting from the status quo, and a detriment to
the beneficiary of a legislative-administrative effort to alter the
status quo.
Can this retarding effect be condoned as merely incidental to
a more important consideration, i. e., the purpose behind requir-
ing an administrative agency to make an explicit finding of fact?
Presumably that purpose, in situations where the finding is a
mere repetition of statutory language and is clearly indicated by
the evidence already before the agency, is to make certain that
the agency has brought a responsive deliberative judgment to
bear in determining whether the facts which it has considered
fall within the prescribed statutory pattern.23 If that be the case,
Ry. Co. v. U. S. (1930) 282 U. S. 74; United States v. Louisiana (1933)
290 U. S. 70, discussed on pages 77-82, infra and F. C. C. v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station (1940) 309 U. S. 470, discussed in note 84 (Part Two),
infra.
22. A similar obtuseness to the speed with which events in the arena
of labor conflict march is to be found in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. (1941) 312 U. S. 287, 298, where Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the Court's majority, says: "If an appropriate
injunction were put to abnormal uses in its enforcement, so that encroach-
ments were made on free discussion outside the limits of violence, as for
instance discussion through newspapers or on the radio, the doors of this
Court are always open." Compare with this: " * * * the suspension of
strike activities, even temporarily, may defeat the strike for practical pur-
poses and foredoom resumption, even if the injunction is later lifted."
Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 210. As already
indicated, employers likewise may also suffer from delay, see note 17, supra.
23. The court in the Twin City Milk Producers case (C. C. A. 8, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 564, said of the requirement for administrative findings of fact:
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comparison may be instructive with a device intended to insure
an analogous effect in the field of contract law, the doctrine of
the seal, which, in the words of Chancellor Kent, gives "cere-
mony and solemnity to the execution of important instruments. '24
Here it has been noted that "with the routine printing of the
letters 'L. S.' on law blanks, the solemn effect of the act of seal-
ing was much impaired. It is highly doubtful today whether the
presence of the seal on the paper or even the addition of the
seal to a writing actually implies greater deliberateness than the
signing of the writing by itself.125 As a result, at least twenty-
five jurisdictions have abolished the distinction between sealed
and unsealed instruments, and nine jurisdictions require a show-
ing of additional intention on the part of contracting parties to
be bound, over and above the presence of the seal.2 6 Why should
a routine republication of part of a statute convey any greater
assurance of deliberation and solemnity than a printed seal? In-
asmuch as we are not dealing with more or less intermittent con-
tractual relationships entered into between private parties, but
with public acts undertaken by responsible officials appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate, sworn to obey the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, devoting their
"This requirement is not intended as an arbitrary symbol. The great liberal
minds of the Supreme Court, which have declared the need for the prescrip-
tion, can hardly be accused of being worshippers of mere form. * * * Doubt-
less, it has assuaged the legalistic conscience, by the assurance that only
responsible action has been taken."
24. See Warren v. Lynch (N. Y. 1810) 5 Johns. 239. Note, however,
that the historical function of a seal (and even its present function, see
Cochran v. Taylor (1937) 273 N. Y. 172, 7 N. E. (2d) 89), is to prevent
parties from questioning the binding effect of a promise. The effect of the
current dogma relating to findings of fact, on the other hand, is to permit
litigants to question the propriety and binding effect of administrative
action.
25. New York Law Rev'n. Comm., Acts, Recommendation and Study
Relating to the Enforcement of Certain Written Contracts, Legislative Doc.
No. 65 (M) (1941), p. 31. See also Llewellyn, On the Complexity of Consid-
eration (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 777, 781; Mason, The Utility of Considera-
tion-A Comparative View (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 825, 837, 845.
26. Comment, The Present Status of the Sealed Obligation (1939) 34
Ill. L. Rev. 457. In New York the mere presence of the seal upon a written
instrument is not sufficient to establish it as a specialty, in the absence
of a recital of sealing. See Transbel Investment Co. v. Venetos (1938)
279 N. Y. 207, 18 N. E. (2d) 129. This anomalous rule of law, deriving
from the diminished import of the seal in practice, is an example of the
judicial fallacy, indulged in the findings field, that people can confer by
self-serving declarations an assurance of veracity or deliberation that they
cannot confer by their positive actions. It clashes oddly with the general
common law distrust of this type of testimonial evidence.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ADMINISTRATIVE FACT FINDINGS
full time to consideration of the statutory standards and objec-
tives which they are applying and administering, and assisted
by an expert staff sworn to be similarly diligent, what index of
added deliberation and correctness of judgment is a formulary
device like a finding of fact couched in statutory language?
III. DISPENSABILITY OF FACT FINDINGS:-
ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW; "EXECUTIVE" AND
"LEGISLATIVE" ACTIVITY
It is obvious that, epistemologically speaking, facts can be
"found" without being stated, and a few courts have been bold
and Berkeleyan enough in this field to recognize that esse est
percipi; these courts infer, from the fact that administrative
officials have taken action, that those officials have found the
facts prerequisite to such action, and hence forego insistence
upon explicit findings of fact.27 Most courts, however, reject this
approach. In deference to this fact and the confused constitu-
tional status of findings of fact, the prevailing legislative mode
is to prescribe administrative findings of fact in the authorizing
statute ;28 and the courts interpret these provisions to mean writ-
ten findings.29 This legislative tendency makes it difficult to deter-
27. " * * * where, as in the present case, an act is to be done, or patent
granted upon evidence and proofs to be laid before a public officer, upon
which he is to decide, the fact that he has done the act or granted the
patent, is prima facie evidence that the proofs have been regularly made,
and were satisfactory. * * * It is not, then, necessary for the patent to
contain any recitals that the prerequisites to the grant of it have been
duly complied with, for the law makes the presumption; and if, indeed,
it were otherwise, the recitals would not help the case without the auxiliary
proof that these prerequisites had been, de facto, complied with." Phila-
delphia and Trenton R. R. v. Stinpson (U. S. 1840) 14 Pet. 448, 458, 459.
Accord, Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (1925)
119 Kan. 47, 237 Pac. 1037.
28. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div. (1941)
312 U. S. 126; Missouri Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1937)
94 F. (2d) 623, cert. den. (1938) 303 U. S. 655; Saginaw Broadcasting Co.
v. F. C. C. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 554, cert. den. (1938) 305 U. S.
618; Bituminous Coal Act (1937) 50 Stat. 72, c. 127, §2, 15 U. S. C. A.
§829; Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938) 52 Stat. 1055, c. 675, §701(e),
21 U. S. C. A. §371(e) (requiring regulations to be accompanied by "de-
tailed findings of fact"), discussed in Fuchs, The Formulation and Review
of Regulations under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1939) 6 Law and
Contem. Prob. 43, and in Staley Mfg. Co. v. Sec'y of Agriculture (C. C. A.
7, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 258.
29. The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation of the Department
of Commerce has objected to the requirements of current proposed adminis-
trative law bills that decisions of administrative bodies be in writing. This
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mine whether findings of fact are currently required under the
due process clause, or to avoid an undue delegation of legislative
power.8 0 Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage Hour Divi-
sion, however, would certainly seem to indicate that they still
serve a function in establishing that an administrative agency is
not engaging in an invalid delegation of legislative power.3 1
In general, dispensability of findings is correlative with the
degree of unavailability of judicial review.2 Thus, for example,
where there is no judicially assertible right of review,8' there
is lacking any occasion for demanding written findings of fact.
Clear as this single criterion appears on the surface, however,
what about its application where an administrative order is sub-
Bureau apparently makes decisions by telephone every day with respect to
the clearance of vessels, etc. The Attorney General's Committe has recom-
mended oral decisions in the case of trials of officers and seamen for drunk-
enness. Hearings before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the United States Senate (1941) 77th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 674, 675, and
918 (hereafter referred to as "Administrative Procedure Hearings"), p.
591-592.
It is curious to note that the constitutional and statutory requirement
that courts hand down written opinions has been restrictively interpreted
by appellate courts, on the grounds that it hampers the speedy administra-
tion of justice, and that written opinions will be better if fewer in number.
See Comment (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 485.
30. The possibilities of misinterpretation on this score are clearly indi-
cated by tvo cases relied on in the "Hot Oil" case. In Wichita R. R. &
Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm. (1922) 260 U. S. 48, 55, a Kansas
statute provided that "the Commission shall find that [existing] rates * * *
are unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential"
before issuing an order for a rate increase. In Mahler v. Eby (1934) 264
U. S. 32, 44, a federal statute provided that aliens could be deported by the
Secretary of Labor only if he found that they were undesirable residents
of the United States. In both cases, Chief Justice Taft had said that an
order made after hearing was void for lack of express findings, "not only
on the language of the statute, but also on general principles of constitu-
tional government." (Italics supplied). Chief Justice Hughes felt that this
meant that failure by an administrative tribunal to make findings of fact
involved a deprivation of due process of law and was evidence of an invalid
delegation of legislative power. Mr. Justice Cardozo interpreted the cases
to mean only that, "if legislative power is delegated subject to a condition,
it is a requirement of constitutional government that the condition be ful-
filled." Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293 U. S. 388, 488. The writer's
feeling is that nothing more is involved than an innocuous, fortuitous, and
personal commendation by Taft of the legislature's wisdom, from the stand-
point of general constitutional polity, in providing for explicit findings of
fact by the administrative body. The liberal opinion of the Kansas court
in the Consolidated Flour Mills case, note 27, supra, negatives the assump-
tion that the Wichita case enunciated any novel constitutional law doctrine.
31. See note 10, supra.
32. See Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n v. McNutt (C. C. A. 8, 1941)
122 F. (2d) 564.
33. As in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. (1940) 310 U. S. 113.
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ject to collateral attack, e. g., by injunction, but no specific appel-
late procedure is provided for by the statute?34
It is also said that findings of fact need not be made in situa-
tions involving executive action,35 because activities falling with-
in the executive prerogative tend to be political questions char-
acteristically subjected to a minimum of judicial review, and
because a special presumption attaches to the general validity
of executive action. 36 One difficulty with this rule is the merger
of legislative and executive functions so characteristic of current-
day democracies, which, coupled with the quantitative political
ascendency of the executive, blurs perhaps beyond hope of dif-
ferentiation the distinction between the executive and legisla-
tive domains.3 7 Presumably, however, the President's conduct of
international relations, where he exercises a "very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power * * * as the sole organ of the
84. For example, Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. R. (1938) 305 U. S.
177 (determination by I. C. C. that electric railway was not interurban
and hence was subject to Railway Labor Act); Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat'l
Bituminous Coal Comm. (1939) 306 U. S. 56 (order of Bituminous Coal
Commission requiring disclosure of confidential information). See Feller,
Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law (1938)
47 Yale L. J. 647, 668.
85. See Philadelphia & Trenton R. R. v. Stimpson (U. S. 1840) 14 Pet.
448; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293 U. S. 388, 432; United States
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R. (1935) 293 U. S. 454, 465.
36. See Martin v. Mott (U. S. 1827) 12 Wheat. 19, 30 (presidential power
to call forth militia when the United States is invaded or in imminent
danger of invasion); Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. S. Dakota (1919) 250
U. S. 163, 184 (presidential power to take over telegraph and telephone
system as war emergency measure). As a matter of fact, in the absence
of clear evidence to the contrary the Court has said that it will presume
that all public officers have properly discharged their official duties. See
United States v. Chemical Foundation (1926) 272 U. S. 1, 14, 15 (coun-
selor for state department, acting pursuant to authority delegated to him
by President, held authorized to sell chemical patents belonging to alien
enemies).
37. See United States v. Bush & Co. (1940) 310 U. S. 371, 379 (Presi-
dential procedure in promulgating tariff rates intended to equalize differ-
ences in domestic and foreign costs of production is legislative in nature) ;
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp.
v. Hull (1941) 311 U. S. 470, 490; Corwin, The President: Office and
Powers (1940) 122, 123. Although the majority of the "Hot Oil" court
felt that the power exercised was not executive in nature, the confusing
entry must be made that it was in fact exercised by the Chief Executive.
Cf. also Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S. (1933) 288 U. S. 294,
819, discussed p. 77, infra; Report of Special Committee on Administrative
Law (1934) 59 Rep'ts Am. Bar Ass'n 539, 542.
Executive and legislative actions are only different states of the same
political process and political will. Lowenstein, The Balance Between Legis-
lative and Executive Powers: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law
(1938) 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 566, 575.
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federal government" and where secrecy of information is highly
necessary, is executive activity rendering findings of fact otiose.38
Likewise, since procedural safeguards are generally more easily
dispensed with in the field of regulation of foreign commerce 3 9
administrative fact findings are probably similarly dispensable.
Since the justification for dispensing with findings of fact in
these fields lies largely in the aura of secrecy and confidential
treatment which must surround such matters as costs of produc-
tion, similar dispensability is indicated for other administrative
regulatory proceedings requiring secrecy, such as the deporta-
tion of aliens and the granting of applications for patients.4 0
Furthermore, although courts in the past have been loath to
regard economic stress as on a par with military exigency in
justifying judicially unreviewable executive sanctions, 41 perhaps
in time they may concede that administrative action in ameliora-
tion of economic crises also need not be preceded by such specific
formalities as findings of fact.42
It has been a truism that where legislative authority is exer-
cised by an administrative body, the due process clause does not
38. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936) 299 U. S. 304 (up-
holding the Presidential power to make punishable as a crime, by procla-
mation, the sale of arms and munitions to countries engaged in armed
conflict in the Chaco dispute); Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull
(1941) 311 U. S. 470; Mueller v. U. S. (C. C. P. A. 1940) 115 F. (2d)
354. In both the Curtiss-Wright and Mueller cases the empowering statute
directed that findings of fact be made. The way in which the court dis-
missed counsel's contention that the fact findings had not been made in
the form contemplated by the statute, however, justifies the conclusion that
findings of fact may constitutionally be dispensed with in this field.
Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International
Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions (1937) 25 Calif. L. Rev.
643, 665-669, points out that in the field of foreign relations Congress
merely requests the state department to furnish information, whereas in
other situations it directs the executive department to furnish the same.
39. Cf. Buttfield v. Stranahan (1904) 192 U. S. 470; Norwegian Nitrogen
Products Co. v. U. S. (1933) 288 U. S. 294.
40. See Administrative Procedure Hearings, 562-564, 610-611.
41. Cf. Sterling v. Constantin (1932) 287 U. S. 378, 399 (governor of
state held not authorized to proclaim martial law as incident to administra-
tion of state oil conservation law; presumption of such authority present,
but not conclusive upon judiciary).
42. Daniel W. Bell, Under Secretary of the Treasury, testified that the
regulatory functions of the Department are in connection with such mat-
ters as national banks, international currency, and the control of foreign
funds, all of which are associated with national defense. Administrative
Procedure Hearings, 145.
For judicial recognition of the seriousness of the industrial turmoil that
the National Labor Relations Board was established to mitigate, see N. L.
R. B. v. Ford Motor Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 905, 910.
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require findings of fact to be made. Although the direct authority
supporting this belief is both sparse and subject to qualification, 3
this rule derives its major support from the relaxation of other
procedural safeguards in connection with "quasi-legislative" ac-
tivities.44 The courts proceed on the premise that a legislative
function is something which the legislature could do (and per-
haps historically had done) itself, but which it had determined
to delegate to an administrative body. From this they infer that
legislative canons control the sufficiency of the hearing called for
by the due process clause, i. e., that an administrative body per-
forming a legislative function need afford only the hearing that
the legislature itself would have given, which would have been
informal, far from adversary in nature, and would have
amounted to little more than an opportunity to appear before a
legislative committee to testify.45 By analogy, it is assumed that
findings may be dispensed with.
48. In support of this proposition can be cited Pacific States Box &
Basket Co. v. White (1935) 296 U. S. 176 (the inconsistency of which with
the "Hot Oil" case was discussed in note 6, supra); American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. U. S. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 121 aff'd, without dis-
cussion of this point, in (1936) 299 U. S. 232 (prescription of system of
accounts held a legislative rather than a judicial function, which can be
exercised "without first reporting the data upon which it decided that the
proposed rule should be established.") As has been pointed out, the Twin
City case looks the other way, see note 20, supra.
The American Tel. & Tel. case seems to possess little logical continuity
with earlier cases characterizing accounting orders as legislative. The
Supreme Court, when it first upheld the power of the I. C. C. to prescribe
accounts "in its discretion" as not being a delegation of legislative power,
seems to have done so on the basis that the prescription was in large
measure a device for procuring information, and hence in effect amounted
to an administrative regulation of unimportant nature. See I. C. C. v.
Goodrich Transit Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 194, 214. Subsequent cases describ-
ing accounting orders as "legislative" in character, use the "legislative"
label primarily as a justification for refusing to assume jurisdiction. (See
p. 78, infra.) Their real rationale has been that, since accounting classi-
fications were not conclusive, the parties affected thereby were not entitled
to injunctive relief against their enforcement. Norfolk and Western R. R.
v. U. S. (1932) 287 U. S. 134; State Corp. Comm. of Kansas v. Wichita
Gas Co. (1934) 290 U. S. 561; cf. United States v. Los Angeles and Salt
Lake R. R. (1927) 273 U. S. 299. For an excellent discussion indicating
how the courts, with some exceptions, have failed to realize the prescriptive
force of accounting regulations, see Kripke, Accountants' Financial State-
ments and Fact-Finding in the Law of Corporate Regulation (1941) 50
Yale L. J. 1180, 1200 et. seq.
44. This approach assumes (mistakenly we think, see Part Two, infra)
that the compelling consideration behind the courts' insistence on findings
of fact is the giving of notice to the parties affected by administrative
action as to the grounds of such action.
45. An importer affected by the promulgation of new tariff rates could
demand no more. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Ca. v. U. S. (1933)
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The purely opportunistic nature of the "legislative" tag in this
connection is indicated by the fact that some courts, merely out
of a desire to assure full notice to the parties affected by a wage
order, have termed the fixing of minimum wages "quasi-judi-
cial."46 We are ultimately led to Gellhorn's conclusion that "legis-
lative" is a word of art meaning that no preliminary notice need
be given a party affected by administrative action, whereas "judi-
cial" connotes that notice must precede the determination.
47
Furthermore, since notice to parties affected can be given in
other ways than through findings of fact (and, the writer be-
lieves, is not the main reason such findings are called for),48
there would seem to be no legal or substantive reason why "legis-
lative" should connote dispensability of findings merely because
it points to the dispensability of notice. This is not true where
the term "legislative" operates as part of the doctrine of ex-
haustion of administrative remedies to indicate that judicial
intervention is premature while administrative action is in a
"legislative" state, i. e., has not reached the final stage of impact
on the parties covered by the order ;419 courts obviously should not
insist on an administrative record containing final findings of
fact in advance of such time as the administrative proceeding
itself has reached a status of finality appropriate for judicial
review.
Attempts to differentiate quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
activities in terms of the coverage of the administrative act simi-
larly fail to indicate whether or why administrative findings may
288 U. S. 294, 318. Accord, Commonwealth v. Sisson (1905) 189 Mass. 247,
75 N. E. 619, 621; State ex rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark
Milk Co. (1936) 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 Atl. 116, 126; Spokane Hotel Co. v.
Younger (1920) 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595, 598 (fixing of milk prices);
Town of Lexington v. Bean (1930) 272 Mass. 547, 172 N. E. 867, 869
(zoning regulation). But cf. Southern Ry. v. Virginia (1933) 290 U. S.
190, decided by a split court and probably ripe for overruling.
46. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Industrial Comm. (D. C. D. Minn.
1938) 24 F. Supp. 370, 377 (minimum wage order), discussed in Note,
Notice and Hearing in Minimum Wage Regulation (1939) 24 WASHINGTON
U. LAW QUARTERLY 233; O'Grady, Wage-Fixing by Administrative Agen-
cies-Legislative or Judicial? (1939) 27 Geo. L. J. 486 (concluding on the
basis of the Morgan and Prentis cases, that legislative functions like rate-
fixing may have attributes necessitating a judicial hearing).
47. Gellhorn, Administrative Law, Cases and Comments (1940) 360-361.
48. Compare the decisions cited in notes 109 et seq., Part Two, infra, and
decisions in text.
49. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (1908) 211 U. S. 210; Mr.
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1923) 262 U. S.
553, 616; Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (1939) 48 Yale
L. J. 981, 983. See also note 43, supra.
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be dispensed with in the case of legislative or rule-making activ-
ity. Professor Fuchs, for example, defines legislative rule-making
as "the issuance of regulations or the making of determinations
which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and unspecified
persons or situations" as distinguished from the adjudicative
function, "the issuance of orders or findings or the taking of
action applying to named or specified persons or situations." 50
Instructive perhaps in some contexts, this definition places an
emphasis on the mere mechanics of addressing an administrative
order, an emphasis that has no relevance to the basic considera-
tions involved in determining whether to require findings. In
short, if the order is couched in a form apparently applicable to
general classes and operative in futuro, Fuchs calls it legislative,
but if addressed to specific parties as the termination of a specific
outstanding dispute, it may be denominated quasi-judicial.
But how important is the addressograph? Let us look at the
matter functionally. Even legislatures pass private bills remedy-
ing private wrongs; need we therefore be surprised that a court
can say of administrative activity, "we do not agree, because it
is not a general regulation, it is a judicial action"?51 Further-
more, if generality of application be the criterion of "legislative"
rule-making, the Interstate Commission's prescription of power-
operated reverse gears in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.
case, for example, would appear to be the promulgation of a
legislative rule; yet the Court in that case held quasi-jurisdic-
tional findings essential to the constitutional validity of the rule.52
Confusion is furthered by the fact that many of the newer federal
agencies, operating in untrodden fields, have wisely expressed
a preference for formulating their "legislative" rules and gen-
eral policies by the (presumably "judicial") case by case
method.'8
50. See Fuchs, Procedure In Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52
Harv. L. Rev. 259, 260-265.
51. Commonwealth v. Sisson (1905) 189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619, 621.
52. (1935) 293 U. S. 454, discussed more fully in Part Two, infra.
53. Even interpretive regulations-regulations intended as a guide to
individual action under a statute and imposing no legal sanctions in the
event of violation (see Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations (1940)
29 Geo. L. J. 1, 3)-have, so far as individual conduct is concerned, the
coercive effect of legislation. See Administrative Procedure Hearings, 331,
868. The same is true of so-called "directory" matter contained in a com-
mission's report and not embodied in a formal order. See United States v.
Atlanta, B., & C. R. R. (1933) 282 U. S. 522, 528.
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The courts have on occasion supported the proposition that
legislative activity is prospective and judicial activity retroactive
in operation. This notion likewise does not aid us in our special
problem. In any situation where the promulgation of a new rule
or order arises out of dissatisfaction with the way in which a
prior rule, or an unregulated status quo, has been working, the
rule operates in fact not only as a regulation of future conduct,5
but as an adjudication, and frequently a reorganization, of indi-
vidual rights based on past conduct. Even if a rule purports as
a matter of law to be prospective in operation, the individuals
most likely to complain of it are those who conceive that their
past rights are impaired by its adoption. Administration char-
acteristically has the contours of reorganization, a Janus-faced
process looking both to past and future.51
In sum, generality of application and intended futurity of oper-
ation are defective criteria of what differentiates "legislative"
from "judicial" activity,57 and of what justifies administrative
54. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (1908) 211 U. S. 210; Arizona
Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. (1932) 284 U. S. 370 (holding
that a quasi-judicial reparation order could not repeal a quasi-legislative
promulgation of a maximum reasonable rate); Arizona Wholesale Grocery
Co. v. So. Pacific Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 601; and Associated
Industries v. Industrial Welfare Comm. (Okla. 1939) 90 P. (2d) 899. These
cases are examples which strongly endorse the theory that rate-fixing and
wage-fixing are legislative because they look to the future.
55. Compare Judge Lindley's language in Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle
West Utilities Co. (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 663, 682-683, discuss-
ing the reorganization of the Insull utility empire:
"The conduct of any equity receivership is of necessity largely adminis-
trative; it involves more than a decision of 'yes' or 'no' upon a single issue
or a multiple of single issues presented by appropriate pleading. It involves
decisions on matters of policy with nice gradations of refined reasoning and
conservative judgment * * * often * * * questions of policies or courses
of conduct concerning which two apparently equally consistent views may
be taken. Such questions and situations constantly recur in the conduct of
an equity receivership, giving to it a character requiring the exercise of
administrative jurisdiction, as distinguished from decision or controverted
or litigated questions."
56. See Administrative Procedure Hearings, 219-223 (Federal Communi-
cations Commission); id. at 515, 524-525 (Railroad Retirement Board);
id. at 903 (Interstate Commerce Commission).
57. This is especially true of such critical border line instances as rate-
fixing orders, and other public utility regulations, where "adjudication is
the vehicle primarily of future rule rather than consequence for the past."
Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure (1941) 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 401, 420. See also Fuchs, Concepts
and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory (1938) 47 Yale
L. J. 538; O'Grady, Wage-Fixing by Administrative Agencies-Legislative
or Judicial? (1939) 27 Geo. L. J. 486; Morgan v. U. S. (1936) 298 U. S.
468; Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16 F. Supp.
575, 586.
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abstention from fact-finding. The first consequence of following
the admonition of Chief Justice Hughes in the Morgan case 58
not to have regard to the mere form of the proceeding and not to
ignore realities would be to discount in large measure his sub-
sequent remark that a proceeding which has "all the essential
elements of contested litigation" is quasi-judicial. A court should
tackle the problem of administrative findings from the same
standpoint that should guide the administrative agency itself,
the type of hearing intended by Congress, 59 fairness to the parties
affected by its order, and reasonable expeditiousness in settling
the controversy.
A starting point for such an approach that might still find
some utility for the "legislative" concept is Mr. Justice Holmes'
classic statement of the impracticability of the New England
town meeting approach in carrying out the numerous, compli-
cated, and all-inclusive present-day administrative programs;
personal self-representation must take a back-seat as the politi-
cal community expands in size and regulatory vigor.60 To this
insight based on the fact of population growth may be added an
elementary statistical observation. In the Assigned Car Cases,
the Court sustained an order of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission establishing a general rule of coal car distribution among
bituminous coal mines, which order contained a finding that the
existing practice was discriminatory in giving certain mines an
58. Morgan v. U. S. (1938) 304 U. S. 1, 23.
59. Viewed in this light, it is probably correct to say that a statutory
requirement for a "full hearing" gives administrative proceedings a quasi-
judicial character. Morgan v. U. S. (1938) 304 U. S. 1, 23; Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Div. (1941) 312 U. S. 126; cf.
Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 575,
aff'd (1987) 300 U. S. 608. However, had the statute in the Morgan and
Opp cases provided merely for a "hearing" rather than a "full hearing,"
would the Court have reached the same conclusions as to the quasi-judicial
character of the proceedings?
60. "Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption.
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meet-
ing or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power
are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to
the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights
are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. * * *
There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if govern-
ment is to go on." Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of
Colorado (1915) 239 U. S. 441, 445. Accord, People v. Orvis (1922) 301
Ila. 350, 183 N. E. 787; but cf. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1929) 119 Neb. 138, 227 N. W. 452.
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unjust and unreasonable share of railroad services and facilities.
In defending the order against the charge that the evidence and
the findings related to only a few of the carriers covered, Mr.
Justice Brandeis' pointed out that the evidence sustaining the
Commission's induction need not be exhaustive, so long as it
was typical. 61 In other words, the relative quantum of proof
(i. e., the amount of evidence and perhaps also the number of
findings) differs as between legislative and adjudicative pro-
ceedings; a legislative proceeding may rely on a relatively smaller
sampling of the total pertinent evidence and fewer findings than
is necessary where the rights of parties are dealt with in separate
adjudicative proceedings.62
With these two preliminary observations, it may be well to
abandon the attempt to give intelligible content to the doctrine
that "legislative" rule-making, as contrasted with administrative
adjudication, need not be accompanied by findings of fact. The
inchoate nature of the relevant case law seems to justify, with
respect to the requirement of findings of fact, Landis' suggestion
that judicial review of administrative adjudication and adminis-
trative legislation be assimilated to each other, since the same
type of issues influence both types of administrative judgment.03
Furthermore, our analysis has thrown us upon a rationale that
concerns not the making of findings, but rather the quantity of
evidence required to sustain such findings as may be made. When
we return to this strand of thought in the last section of this
article, it will be in connection with the alleged necessity for
subsidiary findings of fact.8 4
(To be concluded in the February issue.)
61. " * * * in establishing a rule of general application, it is not a
condition of its validity that there be adduced evidence of its appropriate-
mess in respect to every railroad to which it will be applicable. In this
-connection, the Commission, like other legislators, may reason from the
-particular to the general." (1927) 274 U. S. 564, 583. For an even more
vigorous statement of the necessity for relying on what the commentators
on scientific method call "imperfect induction," see United States v. Louisi-
ana (1933) 290 U. S. 70, 76.
What we here say relates to such propositions of fact as are arrived
at strictly by induction; as will be pointed out more fully later, adminis-
trative agencies have to be convinced of many propositions that are not
thus derived. See Part Two, infra.
62. See Andree and Seedman, Inc. v. Administrator of Wage and Hour
Div. (App. D. C.), decided June 30, 1941.
63. See Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 150-151.
64. See Part Two, infra.
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